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William R. Corbettt
All this was a long time ago, I remember,
And I would do it again, but set down
This set down
This: were we led all that way for
Birth or Death? There was a Birth, certainly,
We had evidence and no doubt. I have seen birth and death,
But had thought they were different; this Birth was
Hard and bitter agony for us, like Death, our death.
We returned to our places, these Kingdoms,
But no longer at ease here, in the old dispensation,
With an alien people clutching their gods.
I should be glad of another death.
I. INTRODUCTION
It would be hard to find an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court that said less but changed an area of the law more dramatically than
Desert Palace, Inc. v. Costa.' The unanimous opinion of the Court holds
that a plaintiff in an employment discrimination case does not have to
produce direct evidence to be entitled to a mixed-motives jury instruction
under Title VII; rather, a plaintiff simply must present sufficient evidence
that a prohibited characteristic was a motivating factor for the employer's
action. The rationale for the holding is straightforward. The Court
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reasoned that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 amendments to Title VII do not
refer to direct evidence. The Court further explained that circumstantial
evidence is not inherently inferior to direct evidence. The opinion is lean,
and yet it has drastically changed employment discrimination law,
implicitly abolishing thirty years of judicially developed law.
The Costa opinion does not even mention McDonnell Douglas
Corp. v. Green.' Make no mistake about it, for Title VII claims at least,
4
the old McDonnell Douglas proof structure is as dead as a doornail. The
courts need to recognize that McDonnell Douglas cannot survive in a post-
Costa world. The Supreme Court should have said that in Costa. Lawyers
and judges do not like change, however, and it will be hard to let go.
It is important to recognize and appreciate that McDonnell Douglas
died on its thirtieth birthday and to consider the implications of its demise
for employment discrimination law. Plaintiffs and employee rights
advocates are celebrating the death of the McDonnell Douglas proof
structure, the ascendancy of the mixed-motives structure, and the birth of a
new pro-employee/pro-plaintiff era in employment discrimination law. I
see it differently. I think Costa is a birth that may not prove as helpful to
plaintiff-employees as is expected, and the death of McDonnell Douglas
may not cause as much grief for defendant-employers as they fear. As the
law develops in the aftermath of Costa, the birth and death may be hard to
separate, and the celebrants and mourners may find that they are living in a
world not that different from the one they knew before.
II. THE LONG, BOGGY ROAD FROM MCDONNELL DOUGLAS TO COSTA
A. Thirty Years of McDonnell Douglas
In 1973, the United States Supreme Court announced in McDonnell
3. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
4. Costa does not necessarily render McDonnell Douglas inapplicable to intentional
discrimination claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. §1981, or state employment discrimination laws. The
rationale for the Costa holding focuses on the changes wrought by the Civil Rights Act of
1991. That act, by its terms, modified the mixed-motives analysis for Title VII cases. For
example, a federal district court held that Costa has no effect on state discrimination law and
applied the McDonnell Douglas analysis to the state claims in Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003). See infra text accompanying note 90. The Dare
court's analysis may be state-specific, however, because the Price Waterhouse mixed-
motives analysis had never been adopted for state discrimination claims. Some pre-Costa
cases held that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 did not modify the Price Waterhouse mixed-
motives analysis for claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act. See, e.g.,
Lewis v. Young Men's Christian Ass'n, 208 F.3d 1303 (5th Cir. 2000).
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Douglas5 a proof structure to facilitate analysis of employment
discrimination cases involving intentional discrimination. The decision
announced a three-part analytical framework for intentional discrimination
cases in which the plaintiff produces circumstantial evidence. The first
step under this framework requires the plaintiff to establish a prima facie
case of intentional discrimination. To meet the prima facie case, a plaintiff
must prove that: 1) the plaintiff is a member of a protected class; 2) the
plaintiff applied for and was qualified for the job at issue; 3) despite
plaintiffs application and qualifications, plaintiff was rejected; and 4) the
position remained open and the defendant-employer continued to seek
applicants from persons of the same qualifications as the plaintiff.6 Once
the plaintiff establishes a prima facie case, a presumption is created that the
defendant-employer unlawfully discriminated against the plaintiff.7 At this
point, the burden shifts to the defendant to rebut the presumption of
intentional discrimination by producing evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting the plaintiff or preferring someone
else.8 Once the defendant-employer satisfies this burden of production, the
burden shifts back to the plaintiff to prove that the employer's reasons are
merely a pretext for discrimination. 9 The meaning and effect of the second
and third stages were developed in subsequent Supreme Court decisions:
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,0 St. Mary's Honor
Center v. Hicks," and Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Products, Inc.'2
For three decades the McDonnell Douglas or pretext analysis has been
the centerpiece of employment discrimination law. Although developed in
a Title VII case, the pretext analysis has been applied under all the federal
employment discrimination laws. 3  Because the vast majority of
employment discrimination cases are intentional discrimination cases
(disparate treatment) and the overwhelming majority of those cases are
based on circumstantial evidence, the pretext proof structure has been used
to analyze most employment discrimination cases. Thus, for thirty years,
any change or development regarding the McDonnell Douglas analysis has
been a matter of great significance in employment discrimination law.
Although the pretext proof structure has been characterized by the
5. 411 U.S. 792 (1973).
6. Id. at 802.
7. Texas Dep't of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
8. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802.
9. Id. at 804.
10. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
11. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
12. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
13. See, e.g., West v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., 330 F.3d 379 (5th Cir. 2003)
(applying pretext analysis in ADEA case); Patten v. Wal-Mart Stores E., Inc., 300 F.3d 21
(1st Cir. 2002) (applying pretext analysis in ADA case).
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Court as an aid to plaintiffs 14 and it has done yeoman's service as the
analytical structure for most employment discrimination cases, it has not
been very popular among many scholars and employee rights advocates,
and many have called for its abandonment. 15 Although it was developed to
facilitate plaintiffs in presenting their cases, most of the Supreme Court's
subsequent interpretations have not been favorable to plaintiffs. 6  For
example, in the first major Supreme Court decision to explain and refine
the McDonnell Douglas analysis, Burdine,7 the Supreme Court reversed
the court of appeals' holding that not only the burden of production, but
also the burden of persuasion shifts to the defendant at stage two of the
analysis." The Supreme Court also rejected the court of appeals' holding
that at stage two the defendant's proof of its legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason must include evidence that the objective qualifications of the
plaintiff were inferior to those of the person selected. Thus, the Supreme
Court in Burdine interpreted stage two less advantageously for plaintiffs
both procedurally and substantively than had the court of appeals.
Most notorious in the development of McDonnell Douglas was the
battle of pretext-plus versus pretext-only. 2° The substantive issue was
whether proving that the employer's legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason
was pretextual at stage three was the equivalent of proving discrimination.
Defendants argued that it was not enough for plaintiffs to prove pretext;
rather, they must also prove the ultimate issue of discriminatory motive.
Plaintiffs argued that the analysis equated the two proofs; proving pretext
meant that a plaintiff had proved discrimination. This issue was important
regarding two burdens resting on plaintiffs: the burden of persuasion and• 21
the burden of production. In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, the Court
held that plaintiffs do not, as a matter of law, win cases (satisfy the burden
14. Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
15. See, e.g., Kenneth R. Davis, The Stumbling Three-Step, Burden-Shifting Approach
in Employment Discrimination Cases, 61 BROOK. L. REV. 703 (1995); Deborah C.
Malamud, The Last Minuet: Disparate Treatment After Hicks, 93 MICH. L. REV. 2229, 2236
(1995); Stephen W. Smith, Title Vii's National Anthem: Is There a Prima Facie Case for
the Prima Facie Case?, 12 LAB. LAW. 371 (1997). Professor John Valery White collects
and critiques criticisms of McDonnell Douglas in John Valery White, The Irrational Turn in
Employment Discrimination Law: Slouching Toward a Unified Approach to Civil Rights
Law, 53 MERCER L. REV. 709 (2002).
16. See, e.g., Malamud, supra note 15, at 2236 (describing McDonnell Douglas and its
progeny as departing from pro-plaintiff decisions of the early 1970s).
17. 450 U.S. 248 (1981).
18. Id. at 254-57.
19. Id. at 258-59.
20. These terms were coined in Catherine J. Lanctot, The Defendant Lies and the
Plaintiff Loses: The Fallacy of the Pretext-Plus Rule in Employment Discrimination Cases,
43 HASTINGS L.J. 57 (1991).
21. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
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of persuasion) by proving pretext; they may win, but they do not
necessarily win by proving pretext. Although the case was hailed as a great
victory by defense interests and decried as a calamity by employee rights
22
advocates, the more significant issue was what stage three pretext meant
regarding defendants' motions challenging sufficiency of the evidence
(motions for summary judgment and judgment as a matter of law). Hicks,
addressing as it did the burden of persuasion, did not resolve that issue. In
Reeves,23 the Supreme Court rejected a pretext-plus approach to the issue,
and it leaned toward pretext-only, but refused to adopt a rule. Instead the
Court said that proof of pretext would permit a trier of fact to conclude the
defendant discriminated, but it would not necessarily always sustain such a
24
finding.
Thus, one reason for McDonnell Douglas falling into such disfavor
with plaintiff-employee interests and theoreticians is that its three stages
have not been developed by courts and the Court in ways that they favor.
For plaintiffs, neither stage two nor stage three developed as favorably as
they would have liked. Theoreticians disparage the meaningless of the
structure if plaintiffs can satisfy the two stages on which they bear burdens
and then still have to prove something else (the ultimate issue of
discrimination) in order to survive a challenge to the sufficiency of the
evidence or to satisfy the burden of persuasion.
The other reason why McDonnell Douglas became so unpopular is the
emergence of the mixed-motives proof structure in 1989. As the next
section discusses, the alternate proof structure developed as a seemingly
more plaintiff-friendly analysis than the McDonnell Douglas pretext
structure. Moreover, the issue of which of the two proof structures applied
in any particular case vexed lawyers, courts, scholars, and everyone else.
The criterion relied upon to make the distinction (direct evidence or
circumstantial evidence) has been both difficult to apply in practice and
difficult to justify in theory.
B. Mixing It Up: Price Waterhouse and the Civil Rights Act of 1991
In 1989 the Supreme Court announced a second proof structure for
22. See, e.g., Deborah A. Calloway, St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks: Questioning the
Basic Assumption, 26 CONN. L. REV. 997 (1994).
23. 530 U.S. 133 (2000).
24. Id. at 148. For detailed consideration of Reeves and its implications for
employment discrimination law, see John V. White & Gregory Vincent, Symposium,
Employment Discrimination and the Problems of Proof, 61 LA. L. REV. 487 (2001); see also
White, supra note 15, at 750-54 (discussing the minimal effect that Reeves had on limiting
the disposition of disparate treatment cases by judges through summary judgment or
judgment as a matter of law).
25. See, e.g., Calloway, supra note 22.
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26intentional discrimination cases in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins. The
plurality's proof structure is commonly referred to as the mixed-motives
analysis because it permits a finding that the adverse employment decision
was taken for lawful and unlawful reasons. The first step of this analysis
required the plaintiff to show that a protected characteristic was a
21motivating factor in the employment decision. Justice O'Connor's
concurring opinion stated the standard of causation as higher than
motivating factor: causation should be measured by determining whether a
protected characteristic was a substantial factor in the employment
28decision. Once the plaintiff met her burden, the burden then shifted to the
defendant-employer to prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it
would have taken the same action for legitimate, nondiscriminatory29
reasons. This affirmative defense, often called the same-decision defense,
permitted the defendant to escape liability.
After Price Waterhouse, courts struggled with two issues. First, they
had to glean the standard of causation from the divided Price Waterhouse
decision. Justice O'Connor's substantial factor test was the standard used
by most courts after the Price Waterhouse decision. Second, courts had to
decide what criterion determined whether a particular case was analyzed
under Price Waterhouse or McDonnell Douglas. Courts seized upon the
distinction made by Justice O'Connor in her concurrence: cases involving
direct evidence were analyzed under mixed-motives, and cases involving
circumstantial evidence were analyzed under the pretext framework.3 °
The substantial factor causation standard was legislatively overruled
by the amendments to Title VII in the Civil Rights Act of 199 1. Title VII
now provides that an unlawful employment practice is established when it
is demonstrated that a protected characteristic was a motivating factor for
32an employment decision. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 also changed the
employer's affirmative defense in the mixed-motives analysis. No longer
is evidence that the same action would have been taken for legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons a complete defense. Under the amendments, a
plaintiff's remedies are merely limited by the defendant-employer's
26. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
27. Id. at 257.
28. Id. at 265 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
29. Id. at 257.
30. Id. at 270-71 (O'Connor, J., concurring). For an argument that Justice O'Connor's
statements about direct evidence should be viewed as dictum because her vote did not
substantially affect the outcome of the case, see Recent Cases, Employment Law-
Discrimination: Ninth Circuit Finds for Employee in a Mixed-Motive Case Without Direct
Evidence of Discrimination: Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc), cert. granted, 123 S. Ct. 816 (2003), 116 HARV. L. REV. 1897 (2003).
31. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071.
32. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m).
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affirmative defense: declaratory and injunctive relief (except admission,
reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment), attorney's fees and costs are
available, but no damages or payments of money to the plaintiff.33
After the Civil Rights Act of 1991, courts continued to decide which
proof structure applied based on whether the evidence was direct or
circumstantial. Courts adopted different approaches, however, to what
constituted direct evidence. The distinction between the two types of
evidence thus was not understood consistently or well, and much depended
upon the determination of which proof structure applied. One court
expressed this well:
[A]lthough the results of the [pretext and mixed-motives]
analyses are significantly different, the analytic difference
between these two types of cases is razor-thin, which has made
the area a particularly difficult one for the courts, and has
prompted significant criticism from the academy.36
Courts and commentators have described the two-proof-structure
37 38 39
situation as a swamp, a quagmire, and a morass. Indeed, many
commentators have urged clarification of the law in this area through
abandonment of the McDonnell Douglas analysis and retention of mixed-
motives.40 Given the pedigree of McDonnell Douglas, that result seemed
unlikely until the Ninth Circuit broke with established law in deciding
Costa.
33. 42 U.S.C.A. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
34. See, e.g., Fuller v. Phipps, 67 F.3d 1137 (4th Cir. 1995); Russell v. Microdyne
Corp. 65 F.3d 1229 (4th Cir. 1995).
35. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 851-52 (9th Cir. 2002) (discussing
three different approaches in the circuits to defining direct evidence for purposes of
determining the applicable proof structure), aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2148 (2003).
36. Russell, 65 F.3d at 1237.
37. Robert Belton, Mixed-Motive Cases in Employment Discrimination Law Revisited:
A Brief Updated View of the Swamp, 51 MERCER L. REV. 651 (2000).
38. See Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838, 853 (9th Cir. 2002), affd, 123 S. Ct.
2148 (2003).
39. Id.
40. Professor Michael Zimmer has been the principal proponent. See, e.g., Michael J.
Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence: Individual Disparate Treatment Discrimination and the
ADEA, 51 MERCER L. REV. 693 (2000) [hereinafter Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence]; Michael
J. Zimmer, The Emerging Uniform Structure of Disparate Treatment Discrimination
Litigation, 30 GA. L. REV. 563 (1996) [hereinafter Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure];
see also Robert A. Kearney, The High Price of Price Waterhouse: Dealing with Direct
Evidence of Discrimination, 5 U. PA. J. LAB. & EMP. L. 303, 310, 312 (2003); Benjamin C.
Mizer, Note, Toward a Motivating Factor Test for Individual Disparate Treatment Claims,
100 MICH. L. REV. 234 (2001).
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C. Costa: Blazing a Trail Out of the Morass
Catherine Costa was characterized as a trailblazer. She was employed
by Caesars Palace Hotel and Casino (Caesars), where she worked in the
warehouse operating forklifts and pallet jacks to retrieve food and beverage
orders. Costa was the only woman employed in this job and the only
woman in the bargaining unit covered by a collective bargaining agreement
between Caesars and Teamsters Local 995. Despite her work being
characterized as excellent and good, Costa experienced problems with
management and her coworkers. Costa noticed that she was being singled
out because she was a woman and when she voiced these concerns, she was
41
treated as an outcast.
Costa asserted that she was subjected to a number of actions,
including informal rebukes, denial of privileges accorded to male
coworkers, suspension, and ultimately termination. Even though the
evidence presented at trial showed Costa had a long history of disciplinary
problems, the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, determined that she had
received harsher discipline than her male coworkers, that she was treated
differently from the men in the assignment of overtime, and that "she was
penalized for her failure to conform to sexual stereotypes. 43
Costa's termination occurred after a verbal and physical altercation
with a male coworker. The male coworker, a twenty-five-year employee
with a good disciplinary record,44 received a five-day suspension. Costa,
on the other hand, was terminated. Both Costa and the male coworker
grieved their respective disciplines pursuant to the collective bargaining
agreement, and both decisions were upheld by the arbitrator. Costa then
filed suit alleging gender discrimination and termination in violation of
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The trial court dismissed her
claim of sexual harassment on summar4Y judgment, but allowed her other
disparate treatment claims to proceed. The jury returned a verdict in
favor of Costa for $64,377.74 in back pay, $200,000 in compensatory
46damages, and $100,000 in punitive damages. Caesars appealed.
Caesars' principal contention on appeal was that the district court
erred in giving a mixed-motives jury instruction rather than a McDonnell
Douglas pretext instruction.47 Caesars did not contend that the jury
41. Costa, 299 F.3d at 844.
42. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 268 F.3d 882 (9th Cir. 2001), aff'd in part, rev'd in
part and remanded in part, 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002).
43. Costa, 299 F.3d at 845.
44. Costa, 268 F.3d at 884.
45. Costa, 299 F.3d at 846.
46. This amount was later remitted to $100,000. Id. at 847.
47. Costa, 268 F.3d at 885.
You have heard the evidence that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was
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instruction misstated the law regarding a mixed-motives analysis; rather, it
argued that it was legal error to give this instruction based on the evidence
48
presented.
1. The Ninth Circuit Panel Decision
In its opinion, the Ninth Circuit panel discussed how a Title VII claim
may proceed on either a single-motive (or pretext) theory or a mixed-
motivs thory 49 Ntbmotives theory. 49 otably, at no time during the litigation did Costa seek
to raise a pretext claim. Costa specifically contended that the evidence
she presented showed that Costa was definitely being treated differently
from her male coworkers and a reasonable mind could conclude that it was
because she was a woman.5' Holding that the mixed-motives jury
instruction was improper, the court concluded that even if the evidence of
differential treatment raised an inference of discrimination, it did not prove
that gender was a motivating factor in the employment decision. Because
Costa failed to produce direct and substantial evidence of discriminatory
animus, the district court erred in giving a mixed-motives jury instruction.
2. The Ninth Circuit Decision on Rehearing En Banc
Rehearing the case en banc, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part,
reversed and remanded in part. 53 The nine member majority, analyzing the
text of Title VII, determined that "[t]he inquiry is simply that of any civil
motivated by the plaintiffs sex and also by other lawful reasons. If you find
that the plaintiffs sex was a motivating factor in the defendant's treatment of
the plaintiff, the plaintiff is entitled to your verdict, even if you find that the
defendant's conduct was also motivated by a lawful reason. However, if you
find that the defendant's treatment of the plaintiff was motivated by both gender
and lawful reasons, you must decide whether the plaintiff is entitled to damages.
The plaintiff is entitled to damages unless the defendant proves by a
preponderance of the evidence that the defendant would have treated plaintiff
similarly even if the plaintiff's gender had played no role in the employment
decision.
Id.
48. Id. at 886.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 890.
51. Id. at 888.
52. Id. at 889. The jury verdict regarding discrimination was vacated. The panel also
reversed the judgment regarding the termination claim and remanded the punitive damages
claim in light of Kolstad v. Am. Dental Ass'n, 527 U.S. 526 (1994).
53. Costa v. Desert Palace, Inc., 299 F.3d 838 (9th Cir. 2002), aff'd, 123 S. Ct. 2148
(2003). For commentary that is critical of the Ninth Circuit's decision, see Brian W.
McKay, Note, Mixed Motives Mix-Up: The Ninth Circuit Evades the Direct Evidence
Requirement in Disparate Treatment Cases, 38 TULSA L.J. 503, 519 (2003).
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case: whether the plaintiffs evidence is sufficient for a rational factfinder
to conclude by a preponderance of the evidence that the employer violated
the statute that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a
motivating factor for any employment practice.' 54  Applying the
motivating factor standard to causation, the Ninth Circuit turned to the
question of the need for direct evidence of discrimination after the Civil
Rights Act of 1991's amendments to Title VII. Justice O'Connor's
concurrence in Price Waterhouse referenced the need for direct evidence to
show the employer's decision was discriminatory before the burden would
be shifted to the defendant employer. The Ninth Circuit rejected this
special requirement and concluded that Congress did not impose a special
or heightened evidentiary burden on the plaintiff in a case involving
possible mixed motives. Accordingly, a plaintiff can establish a Title VII
violation by a preponderance of the evidence (direct or circumstantial) that
a protected characteristic played a motivating factor in the employer's
decision. 57  The court then turned to the McDonnell Douglas pretext
analysis and explained how and why it survives even after the abrogation• . 58
of the direct evidence requirement for mixed-motives.
3. The Supreme Court Decision
The Supreme Court opinion said much less than the Ninth Circuit's
opinion. The holding was succinctly stated: "In order to obtain an
instruction under §2000e-2(m), a plaintiff need only present sufficient
evidence for a reasonable jury to conclude, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that 'race, color, religion, sex, or national origin was a motivating
factor for any employment practice'. . .. [D]irect evidence of
discrimination is not required in mixed-motive cases." 59 The rationale for
the holding was simple. First, the section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
that amended Title VII to provide for the motivating factor standard doesS 60
not mention a direct evidence requirement. Second, circumstantial
evidence is not inherently inferior to direct evidence, and absent a statutory
requirement, the Court has never restricted a litigant to production of direct
evidence. Finally, the Court did not believe that Congress would have
used the word "demonstrate" to require direct evidence in §2000e-2(m) and
54. Costa, 299 F.3d at 848 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m)).
55. Id. at 849.
56. Id. at 851.
57. Id. at 853-54.
58. For discussion of this part of the court's opinion, see infra Part III.A.2.
59. Costa, 123 S. Ct. at 2155 (quoting 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(m)).
60. Id. at 2153.
61. Id. at 2154.
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differently in the same-decision defense section, §2000e-5(g)(2)(B). 6
Il. OF BIRTHS AND DEATHS
A. Is McDonnell Douglas Dead? Views of the Supreme Court and Ninth
Circuit
1. Empty Supreme Court Opinion, Loaded Oral Arguments
The Supreme Court said nothing in its opinion in Costa about
McDonnell Douglas. The only statement that even comes close is in a
footnote: "This case does not require us to decide when, if ever, § 107
applies outside the mixed-motive context. 63 Essentially, the Court said it
did not have to answer the question of whether mixed-motives has
consumed McDonnell Douglas. Is it so clear, then, that thirty years of
employment discrimination law is dead? Yes. This is a monumental point,•64 6
and it is one that neither courts nor commentators seem to accept.
65
In the oral argument of Costa, the effect of affirming the Ninth Circuit
decision on the two proof structures was debated. For example, the
attorney for the United States responded to a question as follows:
The-the key point that you're missing there is that if you
interpret 2000e-2(m) in that way, you would be rendering
superfluous 2000e- 2(a)(1) which requires but for cause by virtue
of the because of language. And if-if under the-that's because
in order to show a violation, a plaintiff would only have to show
motivating factor, not but for cause. It would render-no plaintiff
would ever seek to prove a 200e-2(a) case. They'd always seek
to prove a 2000e-2(m) case.
Later in the oral argument, the attorney for Costa was pressed on the
continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas if the Court affirmed the Ninth
Circuit. He attempted to rely on the Ninth Circuit's explanation that
McDonnell Douglas would not be swallowed by mixed motives, but he
finally agreed that any case that proceeded beyond summary judgment
62. Id. at 2154-55.
63. Id. at2151 n.1.
64. See infra the discussion of the Ninth Circuit majority in Costa regarding the
continuing viability of McDonnell Douglas.
65. See, e.g., Zimmer, Chaos or Coherence, supra note 40, at 699; Kearney, supra note
40, at 310-11.
66. See Oral Argument, No. 02-679 (Apr. 21, 2003) (Oral Argument of Irving L.
Goldstein on Behalf of the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting the Petitioner), 2003
WL 2011040, at 24-25 [hereinafter Oral Argument].
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would be under mixed-motives.
67. QUESTION: Is-is this correct, that McDonnell Douglas survives on
your reading in a case in which the defendant does not go forward with
anything? The plaintiff puts in enough to make a prima facie case. Defendant
sits mute. McDonnell Douglas controls the result there. If the defendant does
go forward with something at that point-and-and here I'm not sure of this,
but I think-by definition, it then becomes a mixed-motive case, doesn't it?
Under (in)?
MR. PECCOLE: I believe it does.
QUESTION: Okay.
MR. PECCOLE: I think-
QUESTION: So McDonnell survives in the case of the mute defendant. In the
non-mute defendant, (in) governs everything.
MR. PECCOLE: Let me see if I can answer. McDonnell Douglas, as has been
suggested-it's used at the very preliminary stage of a-of a case. McDonnell
Douglas at some point in that decision then bursts. It goes away. And so what
you're left with is the 71-or 703(a) and the 703(m). Now, I'm-here I'm-
again I'm relying on what the Ninth Circuit said. They are still giving
McDonnell Douglas cases some deference, but what they are saying in fact is
yes, once you're past that stage, basically the 703(m) cases will come into play.
That will be the instructions to the jury.
QUESTION: Does it-does it-just for clarifying in my mind, does it matter or
doesn't it matter whether you say (m) governs a separate set of cases? When I
came in, I thought the answer to that was no, it doesn't, that (e) governs every
case because the cause can govern the two-motive cases too, and that in (in)
Congress was simply clarifying that there could be such cases, and then they go
on to say what happens. But the Government made a very good point and said
no, I shouldn't look at it that way and I should look at it as if e governs the
single-motive case and then (in) comes in to govern the dual-motive case. And
that was a good argument too. And so what I'm asking you, who understands
this a little better than I do, does it matter?
MR. PECCOLE: No.
QUESTION: No, it doesn't matter. That's it.
QUESTION: Well, how many-what percentage of all these cases, do you
think, are single-motive cases?
MR. PECCOLE: To guess, I would-I would say probably a vast majority of
the cases are. They're-or not single. Excuse me. Those are mixed-motive
cases.
QUESTION: Well, you don't suggest the defendant always admits liability, do
you?
MR. PECCOLE: No.
QUESTION: If there's only issue about one motive, it's always that the
defendant has some kind of defense in every case.
QUESTION: If he stands mute, he-he loses. I mean, under McDonnell
MCDONNELL DOUGLAS
The oral argument in the Supreme Court correctly demonstrates that
affirming the Ninth Circuit killed off McDonnell Douglas except for
single-motive cases. As the justice questioning Costa's attorney
recognized, such cases are only those in which the defendant offers no
reason, thus putting no second motive at issue. A defendant loses a case
under the McDonnell Douglas analysis if the plaintiff makes out a prima
facie case and the defendant does not bear its burden of production at stage
two to produce a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason. 68 There are no such
cases.
2. Confusion in the Ninth Circuit's En Banc Opinion
The Ninth Circuit did address the continuing viability of McDonnell
Douglas in its en banc opinion in Costa. First, the Ninth Circuit said that
McDonnell Douglas "primarily applies to summary judgment
,,69proceedings. Beyond summary judgment, it is not relevant. The court
further misexplained that there was a distinction between McDonnell
Douglas, which applies to summary judgment proceedings on the one
hand, and single-motive and mixed-motives, which primarily refer to the
theory or theories by which the defendant opposes the plaintiffs claim of.... 71
discrimination. The court explained its erroneous view on this matter by
Douglas, if the plaintiff comes in with-with a claim that this was the motive
and the-and the defendant doesn't come up with anything, he loses, doesn't he?
MR. PECCOLE: Yes.
QUESTION: So any case that goes forward is a mixed-motive-is a mixed-
motive case.
MR. PECCOLE: Yes.
QUESTION: Yes.
MR. PECCOLE: Yes. And-and the only thing-the only time that I could see
otherwise would be a-a specific instance where, for example, you have
working women in a-in a department. The employer comes in and says we
have to make a layoff because we're-we're in dire straits. We can't afford it.
They lay off that whole division, and then 2 weeks later they hire a whole male
division. I think that you have the single motive there and-and you-those are
the only kind of cases I can think of.
QUESTION: Yes, they settle, don't they?
MR. PECCOLE: Yes. (Laughter.)
Oral Argument, supra note 66, 2003 WL 2011040, at 35-38.
68. St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 509 (1993).
69. Costa, 299 F.3d at 854.
70. Id. at 855 ("Regardless of the method chosen to arrive at trial, it not normally
appropriate to introduce the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework to the jury.").
71. Id.
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saying that McDonnell Douglas may be used in a single-motive case, but
plaintiffs are not limited to the pretext analysis.7 The court then explained
that at the conclusion of the trial, the court must decide to give the jury one
of two possible instructions: 1) the mixed-motives instruction; or 2) an
instruction that the jury can decide that the discriminatory reason was the
sole reason, or it played no role in the employment action.7 ' The Ninth
Circuit was correct that there was some confusion about mixed motives and
74
pretext, but it was the court that was confused. The court failed to
recognize that its decision that the motivating factor standard did not
require direct evidence must necessarily abolish McDonnell Douglas. The
dissent did recognize this.75 Given the confusion in the Ninth Circuit
opinion, perhaps it is small wonder the Supreme Court chose to affirm
without getting into a discussion of the continuing viability of McDonnell
Douglas.
B. Dead as a Doornail
McDonnell Douglas is dead for Title VII claims because the Supreme
Court eradicated the direct evidence limitation that made motivating
factor/mixed motives applicable to only a discrete set of cases. The Court's
holding that a heightened showing through direct evidence is not required
eliminates the limitation. All cases now will be mixed motives because
that structure has a lower standard of causation than the pretext but-for
standard. Plaintiffs will object to any application of the higher but-for
standard.
The only way around this conclusion is to say that there is a subset of
cases for which motivating factor/mixed motives is not applicable, and
pretextlMcDonnell Douglas applies to them. The Court seemingly left
open that possibility, saying it was not required to decide whether the
motivating factor standard applies to cases that are not mixed motives. As
the oral argument exchanges demonstrate, however, this is an illusion.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 856.
74. The court summarized its confusion as follows:
McDonnell Douglas and mixed-motive are not two opposing types of cases.
Rather, they are separate inquiries that occur at separate stages of the litigation.
Nor are single-motive and mixed-motive cases fundamentally different
categories of cases. Both require the employee to prove discrimination: they
simply reflect the type of evidence offered.
Id. at 857.
75. Id. at 867 (Gould, J., dissenting) ("To keep the mixed motive framework from
overriding in all cases the McDonnell Douglas rule and the pretext requirement, which it
clearly was not meant to do, mixed motive analysis properly is available only in a special
subset of cases.").
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There is no such case unless a defendant simply says, we did not
discriminate, and offers no reason for the employment action it took.
Defendants would lose such cases under a pretext analysis, and there are no
such cases. Once a defendant produces evidence of a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason, the case has at least two motives at issue, and
pretext analysis, with its higher standard of causation, is irrelevant.
First and most obviously, McDonnell Douglas cannot survive for
purposes of jury instructions. Before Costa, among courts that addressed
the issue, there was a split as to whether a court should give a pretext jury
76instruction based on McDonnell Douglas. What the Ninth Circuit said in
its Costa opinion, however, was that such an instruction can be given in a
single-motive case. The single-motive jury instruction endorsed by the
Ninth Circuit is, in fact, a pretext instruction. It is an all-or-nothing
instruction. That is what the McDonnell Douglas pretext analysis does: it
asks the factfinder to pick the one motive for the employment action. In
light of the Ninth Circuit's holding that motivating factor and mixed
motives apply without direct evidence, such an instruction is not possible.
Once a defendant articulates a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason, the
case has become a mixed-motives case. It would not make sense to ask the
jury to determine which reason was the sole reason for the employment
action. All a plaintiff needs to establish liability is a finding that the
discriminatory reason was a motivating factor, and that is a lower standard
7of causation than the single-motive/but-for standard. If a plaintiff can
satisfy the motivating factor standard, then the plaintiff is entitled to a
mixed-motives jury instruction. Thus, if a defendant requested the Ninth
Circuit's single-motive instruction, a plaintiff should object that she does
not have to satisfy that standard. If a plaintiff cannot satisfy the motivating
factor standard, then there is no falling back to a single-motive instruction
for the plaintiff because that is a higher standard, and the plaintiff could not
satisfy it. The justice's question at oral argument of Costa's attorney made
this point:
QUESTION: So any case that goes forward is a mixed-motive-
is a mixed-motive case.
MR. PECCOLE: Yes.
78
QUESTION: Yes.
76. See Townsend v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 294 F.3d 1232 (10th Cir. 2002)
(discussing the split and holding that under some circumstances it is reversible error to
refuse to give a requested pretext instruction).
77. See, e.g., Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins, 490 U.S. 228 (1989); Zimmer, Chaos or
Coherence, supra note 40, at 696-97; Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 40,
at 607-09; Kearney, supra note 40, at 310.
78. See supra note 67.
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Thus, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that its single-motive jury
instruction was, in reality, a McDonnell Douglas pretext instruction, and it
failed to recognize that such an instruction is not viable in light of its
principal holding.79
The second point that the Ninth Circuit made regarding the continuing
viability of McDonnell Douglas was that it is relevant to summary
judgment. If this were true, then the Costa decision would not be that
significant. Since Hicks,80 the principal relevance of the pretext proof
structure has been to motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence
(motions for summary judgment and motions for judgment as a matter of
law). Defendants are enamored with McDonnell Douglas because it is the
basis on which they move for summary judgments. After Costa, it is not
even relevant to summary judgment. Suppose a post-Costa defendant
moves for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiff has not produced
sufficient evidence of pretext. A plaintiff should respond by arguing that
the pretext analysis has nothing to do with it. All the plaintiff must do is
produce sufficient evidence that the illegal reason was a motivating factor,
and that is a lower standard of causation than the pretext analysis requires.
81
The only argument one could make for the continuing viability of
McDonnell Douglas is that a plaintiff might prefer to prove her case under
that proof structure, proving the higher standard of causation, in order to
deprive a defendant of the same-decision defense. That argument seems
fanciful, however, in light of plaintiffs' current preference for the mixed-
motives analysis and its burden shift to the defendant.
In sum, McDonnell Douglas is not procedurally relevant any longer at
the stage of jury instructions or even summary judgment. It is dead.
IV. ARE THE COURTS PAYING THEIR RESPECTS TO MCDONNELL DouGLAs?
I thought that judges and lawyers, who are conservative and reluctant
to change, would cling to McDonnell Douglas in the aftermath of Costa. It
was obvious that it would not take long for courts to begin discussing the
issue because the two proof structures are used to analyze all disparate
treatment employment discrimination cases. In the first few months after
the Costa decision was rendered, the results have been mixed. At least two
79. See McKay, supra note 53, at 519.
80. 509 U.S. 502 (1993).
81. One of the pre-Costa commentators came very close to this conclusion, but not
quite. "The pretext analysis of McDonnell Douglas-Burdine would remain relevant, but
only insofar as the burden-shifting scheme allows plaintiffs to show that an impermissible
consideration was a motivating factor." Mizer, supra note 40, at 264. He is correct that
McDonnell Douglas is of no use to defendants, but he suggests that plaintiffs could use it.
Maybe plaintiffs could fit their evidence into it, but it has no procedural significance
anymore.
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courts have placed flowers on the grave and bid McDonnell Douglas
farewell. Some courts have said McDonnell Douglas lives. Others have
avoided the issue.
The most comprehensive treatment of the effect of Costa on
McDonnell Douglas is in Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.82 In Dare, the. 83
court evaluated the plaintiff's claim as a single-motive claim. The court
thus analyzed whether, after Costa, the motivating factor/same-decision
defense analysis applies to a single-motive case. In other words, are there
any cases left to which the McDonnell Douglas analysis applies? The court
concluded that the motivating factor/same-decision defense analysis applies
to single-motive cases.
First, the court reasoned that nothing in the language of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991 restricts the analysis to mixed-motives cases.84 Second,
the court explained that "interests of clarity and accuracy" require85
application of the analysis to single-motive cases. By this, the court
meant two things. First, the McDonnell Douglas analysis, by requiring that
the factfinder determine the single true reason for the employer's adverse
action, seldom if ever reflects reality, as employers rarely make
86
employment decisions for one reason. Thus, the McDonnell Douglas
87
proof structure creates a legal fiction. Second, the court recognized that a
single-motive case is a chimera. Once an employer articulates a legitimate
nondiscriminatory reason at stage two of McDonnell Douglas, a court is
88
left with a classic mixed-motives scenario. Applying the motivating
factor/mixed-motives analysis to the defendant's motion for summary
judgment, the court held that the plaintiffs claims should proceed to trial,
but the court also held that the defendant could file a motion for summary
judgment on its same-decision defense to limit damages. 89 The court held,
however, that the intentional discrimination claim under state employment
discrimination law still would be evaluated under McDonnell Douglas
because state law had incorporated neither the Price Waterhouse analysis
nor the Civil Rights Act of 1991. 90 Another federal district court was
persuaded by Dare in Griffith v. City of Des Moines.91
A federal district court considered the Dare opinion and expressly
rejected the idea that Costa spells the demise of the McDonnell Douglas
82. 267 F. Supp. 2d 987 (D. Minn. 2003).
83. Id. at 990.
84. Id. at 990-91.
85. Id. at 991.
86. Id. at 991-92.
87. Id.
88. Id. at 992.
89. Id. at 993.
90. Id. at 992.
91. 2003 WL 21976027 (S.D. Iowa July 3, 2003).
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92
analysis in Dunbar v. Pepsi-Cola General Bottlers of Iowa. The court
reviewed the decisions addressing the continuing viability of McDonnell
Douglas after Costa and concluded that "this court does not believe that
Desert Palace and §2000e-2(m) necessarily spell the demise of the entire
McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting paradigm."93 The court reasoned that
Costa requires only a modification of the third part of the analysis. Under
the modified part three, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the
evidence either that the defendant's part-two legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason is pretextual or that, while it is a true reason, it is only one reason,
and the prohibited reason is also a motivating factor.94 The court did admit,
however, that it had difficulty envisioning a case in which no possibility of
mixed-motives was raised by the evidence on a summary judgment
record. 95
The Eighth Circuit declined to decide the effect of Costa on
McDonnell Douglas in Allen v. City of Pocahontas, Ark. 96 In Elmahdi v.
Marriott Hotel Services, Inc.,97 however, the Eighth Circuit applied the
McDonnell Douglas analysis to a Title VII claim without any mention of
Costa.
A federal district court rejected the demise of McDonnell Douglas in
an age discrimination claim in Bolander v. BP Oil Co. 98  The court
explained that "the mixed-motives rationale and Desert Palace do not
apply to age discrimination cases." 99
V. WHO IS CELEBRATING A BIRTH AND WHO IS MOURNING A DEATH?
For now, it is clear that plaintiffs, employee rights advocates, and
many scholars are celebrating the birth of the new era in Title VII law with
the ascendancy of mixed-motives. It is defendants and their attorneys who
are mourning the mortal wounding (they may not admit death) of
McDonnell Douglas. A struggle has already begun about the continuing
viability of McDonnell Douglas. If courts ultimately conclude that it is
dead, what will be the effect of all Title VII cases (and perhaps
employment discrimination claims under other statutes) being tried under
the motivating factor and mixed-motives analysis? I am not so sure that
most will find their immediate emotional responses justified in the next few
years. Even if they do not long for the return of McDonnell Douglas,
92. 2003 WL 22290229 (N.D. Iowa, Oct. 7, 2003).
93. Dunbar, 2003 WL 22290229, at *14.
94. Id. at *15.
95. Id. at * 18 n.2.
96. 340 F.3d 551, 557 n.4 (8th Cir. 2003).
97. 339 F.3d 645 (8th Cir. 2003).
98. 2003 WL 22060351 (N.D. Ohio, Aug. 6, 2003).
99. Bolander, 2003 WL 22060351, at *3.
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plaintiffs and their allies may find that the world under mixed-motives is
not much better. Defendants, even if they still miss McDonnell Douglas,
may find that life under mixed-motives is not that bad.
The post-Costa view is that plaintiffs will survive more defense
motions challenging the sufficiency of the evidence and have more cases
decided by juries. It is certainly true that under mixed motives, plaintiffs
have avoided summary judgment much more successfully than under
McDonnell Douglas.'°° If courts are concerned about weak discrimination
cases getting to juries after Costa, however, they may raise the motivating
factor standard. The pretext-plus/pretext-only battle bears witness to the
fact that courts can interpret a standard in different ways.' °1 In other words,
it is possible that the spirit of McDonnell Douglas, which made summary
judgments attainable in cases that courts did not think were strong enough
to go to a jury, may manifest itself in a more stringent version of
motivating factor. A second consideration is that defendants have one
chance to win a mixed-motives case (proving the illegal reason was not a
motivating factor), but a second chance to avoid almost all monetary
remedies (proving they would have taken the same action absent the illegal
reason). Although the burden of persuasion is on them on the same-
decision defense, which should make summary judgment difficult,
defendants may attempt to get summary judgment on the defense. The best
prediction at this time would be that plaintiffs should survive more motions
for summary judgment, but I think there are reasons to be skeptical about
this.
The second result that is possible under Costa is that the mixed-
motives jury instruction may not produce results as good as plaintiffs think
it will. Even if a plaintiff proves motivating factor, a defendant that
prevails under the same-decision defense cuts off all monetary remedies
(except attorney's fees and costs) and positive employment action, such as
reinstatement or promotion.'03 Thus, if a defendant prevails on the defense,104
the plaintiff will go home a winner, but with no money. One cannot
100. Kearney, supra note 40, at 304 & n.8; see also Zimmer, Emerging Uniform
Structure, supra note 40, at 607 (explaining that it is easier for plaintiffs to establish a prima
facie case under the motivating factor test than under the but-for test of McDonnell
Douglas).
101. Professor White argues that Hicks and post-Hicks applications of McDonnell
Douglas are indicative of courts' concern about entrusting weak cases to juries after the
Civil Rights Act of 1991 made jury trials available. See White, supra note 15, at 799-800.
102. Keamey, supra note 40, at 311 n.49 ("There is even a chance, however small, that
a uniform motivating factor standard ends up assisting defendants in these cases. Instead of
just one chance at winning, they now have two chances and two bases for appeal.").
103. 42 U.S.C. §2000e-5(g)(2)(B).
104. Professor Zimmer recognizes the second opportunity afforded defendants by the
same-decision defense, but he believes that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 "reduce[d] the
defendant's same-decision defense from a light at the end of the potential liability tunnel to
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stand many victories like that. How likely is it that juries will find for
defendants on the defense? More likely than many seem to assume. First,
the defense permits a compromise; juries can find that the defendant
discriminated, but not that badly. In a close case, it is an attractive option.
Second, most people probably do recognize that most employment actions
are taken for a number of reasons. Most employees against whom
adverse actions are taken have given employers some legitimate reasons on
which they could act. Thus, the same-decision defense often reflects reality
and people's sense of reality. Third, under McDonnell Douglas, the
decision was all or nothing, and the defendant was more clearly a bad guy.
No compromise was possible, and the employer was either telling the truth
or lying. 06  Plaintiffs may find that juries are more likely to send them
home with no money now that a compromise is possible; all or nothing
may have been better.
A second reason why the same-decision defense may hurt plaintiffs is
that appellate courts may focus on that, rather than the plaintiff's burden on
motivating factor, as the basis for reversing jury verdicts for plaintiffs. If
appellate courts try to compensate for the loss of McDonnell Douglas and
what they perceive to be a very low standard of causation for the
imposition of liability, they may focus on the same-decision defense.
In any event, Costa and the Civil Rights Act of 1991 do not mandate
the demise of McDonnell Douglas analysis in cases under the ADEA, the
ADA, state employment discrimination laws, and Section 1981. The
triumph of the unitary standard may be limited to Title VII. It is possible
that defendants will lose on motions for summary judgments under the
mixed-motives analysis on Title VII claims and win on such motions under
the McDonnell Douglas analysis on their state claims.107  Moreover,
a night light, only allowing the successful defendant to escape paying the plaintiff full legal
and equitable relief." Zimmer, Emerging Uniform Structure, supra note 40, at 609. I
predict that a plaintiff who falls victim to the defense and goes home with no money and no
positive employment action will feel like she was hit by a train.
105. I shy away from saying they are in fact motivated by a number of reasons because I
think Professor Linda Krieger has made a convincing case that employment decisions are
cognitive rather than motivational processes. See Linda Hamilton Krieger, The Content of
Our Categories: A Cognitive Bias Approach to Discrimination and Equal Opportunity, 47
STAN. L. REv. 1161 (1995).
106. The characterization of an employer that is found to have given pretextual reasons
for its actions as a liar was debated by Justice Scalia and Justice Souter in their majority and
dissenting opinions in St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993). Although I
think Justice Scalia, arguing that such a characterization often is inapplicable, got the better
of that debate, it seems probable that a factfinder is likely to find an employer liable for
discrimination if it does not believe the employer's witnesses. See, e.g., Kearney, supra
note 40, at 310-11 ("After catching the employer in a lie, the jury will likely find that the
intent the employer was hiding was actually what motivated the decision.").
107. See, e.g., Dare v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 267 F. Supp. 2d 987, 993-94.
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plaintiffs claiming age discrimination, disability discrimination, and race
discrimination under Section 1981 may not get the same ostensibly
favorable analysis that Title VII plaintiffs get.
VI. CONCLUSION
In Costa, we have witnessed a birth and a death. Both could
dramatically change the world of employment discrimination law. Like
Eliot's magi, we have lost the comfort of being in a familiar world.
Lawyers generally do not like change. Expect lawyers, particularly defense
lawyers, and courts to try to cling tenaciously to McDonnell Douglas.
Once the death of McDonnell Douglas is accepted, however, it will be
interesting to see who is mourning and who is celebrating. My guess is that
the spirit of McDonnell Douglas will not rest in peace, and it is likely to
rule from the grave, eventually producing a post-Costa law that is not so
different from the one when it lived and ruled for thirty years. Moreover,
even if dead under Title VII, where it was born, it may still roam restlessly
in the realm of discrimination laws other than Title VII.
Happy thirtieth birthday, McDonnell Douglas. May you rest in peace?
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